This article develops an elementary theory of global supply chains. We consider a world economy with an arbitrary number of countries, one factor of production, a continuum of intermediate goods and one final good. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize in later stages of production. Using this simple theoretical framework, we offer a first look at how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations.
INTRODUCTION
Most production processes consist of a large number of sequential stages. In this regard the production of pins in late Eighteenth century England is no different from today's production of tee-shirts, cars, computers or semiconductors. Today, however, production processes increasingly involve global supply chains spanning multiple countries, with each country specializing in particular stages of a good's production sequence, a phenomenon which Hummels et al. (2001) refer to as vertical specialization.
This worldwide phenomenon has attracted a lot of attention among policy makers, business leaders and trade economists alike. On the academic side of this debate, a large literature has emerged to investigate how the possibility to fragment production processes across borders may affect the volume, pattern and consequences of international trade; see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Yi (2003) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) . In this article, we propose to take a COSTINOT ET AL.
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that local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom, depending on the nature of technological changes, all countries either move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in inequality between nations. At the top of the chain, in contrast, local technological progress always leads all countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations may either fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top. Section 6 demonstrates how more realistic features of global supply chains may easily be incorporated into our simple theoretical framework. Our first extension introduces trading frictions, which we refer to as "coordination costs". Among other things, we demonstrate that a decrease in coordination costs may lead to "overshooting": more stages of production may be offshored to a small country at intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly free trade. Our second extension allows for the existence of multiple parts, each produced sequentially and then assembled, with equal productivity in each country, into a unique final good using labor. In this environment, the poorest countries tend to specialize in assembly, whereas the richest countries tend to specialize in the later stages of the most complex parts. Our third extension allows for imperfect observability of mistakes. In this situation, we show how differences in failure rates and "quality control" across countries jointly determine the pattern of vertical specialization. We conclude by providing sufficient conditions such that our cross-sectional predictions remain unchanged for more general production functions.
Our article is related to several strands of the literature. First, we draw some ideas from the literature on hierarchies in closed-economy (and mostly partial-equilibrium) models. Important contributions include Lucas (1978) , Rosen (1982) , Sobel (1992) , Kremer (1993) , Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) . As in Sobel (1992) and Kremer (1993) , we focus on an environment in which production is sequential and subject to mistakes, though we do so in a general equilibrium, open-economy setup. Models of hierarchies have been applied to the study of international trade issues before, but with very different goals in mind. For instance, Antràs et al. (2006) use the knowledge economy model developed by Garicano (2000) to study the matching of agents with heterogeneous abilities across borders and its consequences for within-country inequality. Instead, countries are populated by homogeneous workers in our model. 2 In terms of techniques, our article is also related to a growing literature using assignment or matching models in an international context; see, for example, Grossman and Maggi (2000) , Grossman (2004) , Yeaple (2005) , Ohnsorge and Trefler (2007) , Nocke and Yeaple (2008) , Costinot (2009) , Blanchard and Willmann (2010) and Costinot and Vogel (2010) . Here, like in some of our earlier work, we exploit the fact that the assignment of countries to stages of production exhibits positive assortative matching, i.e. more productive countries are assigned to later stages of production, to generate strong and intuitive comparative static predictions in an environment with a large number of goods and countries.
In terms of focus, our article is motivated by the recent literature documenting the importance of vertical specialization in world trade. On the empirical side, this literature builds on the influential work of Hummels et al. (1998) , Hummels et al. (2001) , and Hanson et al.(2005) . Our focus on how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations is also related to the work of Yi (2001, 2006) , Burstein et al. (2008) , and Bergin et al. (2009) who study how production sharing affects the transmission of shocks at business cycle frequency.
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On the theoretical side, the literature on fragmentation is large and diverse; see Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) for a recent overview. Our theoretical framework is most closely related to Dixit and Grossman (1982) , Sanyal (1983) , Yi (2003 Yi ( , 2010 , Harms et al. (2009) , Baldwin and Venables (2010) and Antràs and Chor (2011) who also develop trade models with sequential production. None of these articles, however, investigate how technological change, either global or local, may differentially impact countries located at different stages of the same supply chain. This is the main focus of our analysis.
BASIC ENVIRONMENT
We consider a world economy with multiple countries, indexed by c ∈ C ≡ {1,...,C}, one factor of production, labor, and one final good. Labor is inelastically supplied and immobile across countries. L c and w c denote the endowment of labor and wage in country c, respectively. Production of the final good is sequential and subject to mistakes. To produce the final good, a continuum of stages s ∈ S ≡ (0,S] must be performed. At each stage, producing one unit of intermediate good requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage and one unit of labor.
Mistakes occur along the supply chain at a constant Poisson rate, λ c > 0, which is an exogenous technological characteristic of a country. Countries are ordered so that λ c is strictly decreasing in c. When a mistake occurs on a unit of intermediate good at some stage, that intermediate good is entirely lost. Formally, consider two consecutive stages, s and s+ds, with ds infinitesimal.
If a firm from country c combines q(s) units of intermediate good s with q(s)ds units of labor, its output of intermediate good s+ds is given by q(s+ds) = (1−λ c ds)q(s).
(1)
Note that letting q (s) ≡ [q(s+ds)−q(s)]/ds, Equation (1) can be written as q (s)/q(s) =−λ c . In other words, moving along the supply chain in country c, potential units of the final good get destroyed at a constant rate, λ c . In the rest of our analysis, we often refer to λ c as a measure of total factor productivity. 3 Since λ c is strictly decreasing in c, countries with a higher index c are more productive.
All markets are perfectly competitive and all goods are freely traded. p(s) denotes the world price of intermediate good s. For expositional purposes, we assume that "intermediate good 0" is in infinite supply and has zero price, p(0) = 0. "Intermediate good S" corresponds to the unique final good mentioned before, which we use as our numeraire, p(S) = 1. 
Equation (3) states that the change in the world supply of intermediate goods between stages s 1 and s 2 must be equal to the amount of intermediate goods lost due to mistakes in all countries between these two stages. Equation (4) states that the total amount of labor used across all stages must be equal to the total supply of labor in country c. In the rest of this article, we formally define a free trade equilibrium as follows. 
Existence and uniqueness
We first characterize the pattern of international specialization in any free trade equilibrium. According to Proposition 1, there is vertical specialization in any free trade equilibrium with more productive countries producing and exporting at later stages of production. The formal proof as well as all subsequent proofs can be found in the Appendices. 4 The intuition behind Proposition 1 can be understood in two ways. One possibility is to look at Proposition 1 through the lens of the hierarchy literature; see e.g. Lucas (1978) , Rosen (1982) , and Garicano (2000) .
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Since countries that are producing at later stages can leverage their productivity on larger amounts of inputs, efficiency requires countries to be more productive at the top. Another possibility is to note that since new intermediate goods require both intermediate goods produced in previous stages and labor, prices must be increasing along the supply chain. Thus the labor cost share is relatively lower in the production of intermediate goods produced at later stages, which makes them relatively cheaper to produce in countries with higher wages. In our model these are the countries with higher productivity in all stages. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity differences-here in the form of uniformly lower failure rates at all stages of production-are a source of comparative advantage among nations.
5
We refer to the vector (S 1 ,...,S C ) as the "pattern of vertical specialization" and denote by Q c ≡ Q c (S c ) the total amount of intermediate good S c produced and exported by country c. Using the previous notation, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels can be jointly characterized as follows.
Lemma 1.
In any free trade equilibrium, the pattern of vertical specialization and export levels satisfy the following system of first-order non-linear difference equations:
with boundary conditions S 0 = 0 and S C = S.
Lemma 1 derives from the goods and labor market clearing Conditions (3) and (4). Equation (5) reflects the fact that the exogenous supply of labor in country c must equal the amount of labor demanded to perform all stages from S c−1 to S c . This amount of labor depends both on the rate of mistakes λ c as well as the total amount Q c−1 of intermediate good S c−1 imported from country c−1. Equation (6) reflects the fact that intermediate goods get lost at a constant rate at each stage when produced in country c.
In the rest of this article, we refer to the vector of wages (w 1 ,...,w C ) as the "world income distribution" and to p c ≡ p(S c ) as the price of country c's exports (which is also the price of country c+1's imports under free trade). Let N c ≡ S c −S c−1 denote the measure of stages performed by country c within the supply chain. In the next lemma, we show how the measures of stages being performed in all countries (N 1 ,...,N C ) shape the world income distribution.
5. In his early work on fragmentation, Jones (1980) pointed out that if some factors of production are internationally mobile, then absolute advantage may affect the pattern of international specialization. The basic idea is that if physical capital is perfectly mobile and one country has an absolute advantage in producing capital services, then it will specialize in capital intensive goods. The logic of our results is very different and intimately related to the sequential nature of production. Mathematically, a simple way to understand why sequential production processes make absolute productivity differences a source of comparative advantage is to consider the cumulative amount of labor necessary to produce all stages from 0 to s ≤ S in country c for a potential unit of the final good. By Equation (1), this is equal to e λcs which is log-supermodular in (λ c ,s). This is the exact same form of complementarity that determines the pattern of international specialization in standard Ricardian models; see Costinot (2009) .
The proof of Proposition 2 formally proceeds in two steps. First, we use Lemma 1 to construct the unique pattern of vertical specialization and vector of export levels. In Equations (5) and (6), we have one degree of freedom, Q 0 , which corresponds to total input used at the initial stage of production. Since S C is decreasing in Q 0 , it can be set to satisfy the final boundary condition S C = S. Once (S 1 ,...,S C ) and Q 0 ,...,Q C−1 have been determined, all other output levels can be computed using Equation (1) and Proposition 1. Second, we use Lemma 2 together with the equilibrium measure of stages computed before, (N 1 ,...,N C ), to characterize the unique world income distribution and vector of export prices. In Equations (7) and (8), we still have one degree of freedom, w 1 . Given the monotonicity of p C in w 1 , it can be used to satisfy the other final boundary condition, p C = 1. Finally, once (w 1 ,...,w C ) and (p 1 ,...,p C ) have been determined, all other prices can be computed using the zero-profit Condition (2) and Proposition 1.
Discussion
As a first step toward analyzing how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations, we have provided a full characterization of the free trade equilibrium in a simple trade model with sequential production. Before turning to our comparative static exercises, we briefly discuss the cross-sectional implications that have emerged from this characterization.
First, since rich countries specialize in later stages of production whereas poor countries specialize in earlier stages, our model implies that rich countries tend to trade relatively more with other rich countries (from whom they import their intermediates and to whom they export their output) whereas poor countries tend to trade relatively more with other poor countries, as documented by Hallak (2010) . Second, since intermediate goods produced in later stages have higher prices and countries producing in these stages have higher wages, our model implies that rich countries both tend to import goods with higher unit values, as documented by Hallak (2006) , and to export goods with higher unit values, as documented by Schott (2004) , Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Hallak and Schott (2010) . Following Linder (1961) , the two previous stylized facts have traditionally been rationalized using non-homothetic preferences; see e.g. Markusen (1986) , Flam and Helpman (1987) , Bergstrand (1990) , Stokey (1991) , Murphy and Shleifer (1997) , Matsuyama (2000) , Fieler (2010) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2009) . The common starting point of the previous articles is that rich countries' preferences are skewed toward high-quality goods, so they tend to import goods with higher unit values. Under the assumption that rich countries are also relatively better at producing high-quality goods, these models can further explain why rich countries tend to export goods with higher unit values and why countries with similar levels of GDP per capita tend to trade more with each other.
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The complementary explanation offered by our elementary theory of global supply chains is based purely on supply considerations. According to our model, countries with similar per-capita incomes are more likely to trade with one another because they specialize in nearby regions of the same supply chain. Similarly, countries with higher levels of GDP per capita tend to have higher unit values of imports and exports because they specialize in higher stages in the supply chain, for which inputs and outputs are more costly. Note that our supply-side explanation also suggests new testable implications. Since our model only applies to sectors characterized by sequential production and vertical specialization, if our theoretical explanation is empirically relevant, one would therefore expect "Linder effects" -i.e. the extent of trade between countries with similar levels of GDP per capita-to be higher, all else equal, in sectors in which production processes are vertically fragmented across borders in practice.
The previous cross-sectional predictions, of course, should be interpreted with caution. Our theory is admittedly stylized. In Section 6, we will discuss how the previous results may be affected (or not) by the introduction of more realistic features of global supply chains.
GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Many technological innovations, from the discovery of electricity to the internet, have impacted production processes worldwide. Our first series of comparative static exercises focuses on the impact of global technological changes on different countries participating in the same supply chain. Our goal is to investigate how an increase in the length of production processes, perhaps associated with the development of higher quality goods, as well as a uniform decrease in failure rates worldwide, perhaps due to the standardization of production processes, may affect the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution.
Definitions
It is useful to introduce first some formal definitions describing the changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution in which we will be interested.
Increase in complexity
At the end of the Eighteenth century, Adam Smith famously noted that making a pin was divided into about 18 distinct operations. Today, as mentioned by Levine (2010) , making a Boeing 747 requires more than 6,000,000 parts, each of them requiring many more operations. In this section we analyze the consequences of an increase in the measure of stages S necessary to produce a final good, which we simply refer to as an "increase in complexity".
8
Our approach, like in subsequent sections, proceeds in two steps. We characterize first the changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and second the associated changes in the world income distribution. Our first comparative static results can be stated as follows. The changes in the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution associated with an increase in complexity are illustrated in Figure 1 . The broad intuition behind changes in the pattern of vertical specialization is simple. An increase in complexity tends to decrease total output at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this decrease in output levels must be accompanied by an increase in the measure N c of stages performed in all countries. Proceeding by iteration from the bottom of the supply chain, we can then show that this change in N c can only occur if all countries move up.
The logic behind the changes in the world income distribution is more subtle. From Equation (7) in Lemma 2, we know that relative wages of countries c+1 and c must equate the unit cost of production of the cutoff good S c ,
7. For expositional purposes, we have chosen to state all definitions and propositions in Sections 4 and 5 using weak inequalities. Most of our comparative static results also hold as strict inequalities; see Appendices.
8. For simplicity, we abstract from any utility gains that may be associated with the production of more complex goods in practice. Our analytical results on the pattern of vertical specialization and inequality between nations do not depend on this simplification. But it should be clear that changes in real wages depend on it. Here an increase in complexity necessarily lowers total output, and in turn, real wages. If the utility level associated with the consumption of one unit of the final good were allowed to increase with the complexity of the production process, then an increase in complexity may very well raise real wages.
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Figure 1
Consequences of an increase in complexity Thus, w c+1 /w c is decreasing in w c /p c , which we refer to as the labor cost share of country c's exports.
9 This is reminiscent of the mechanism underlying terms-of-trade effects in a Ricardian model; see e.g. Dornbusch et al. (1977) and Krugman (1986) . From an economic standpoint, Equation (9) captures the basic idea that the wage of country c+1 should increase relative to the wage of country c if and only if c+1 moves into sectors in which it has a comparative advantage. In our model, since country c+1 has a higher wage, these are the sectors with lower labor cost shares. In a standard Ricardian model, these would be the sectors in which country c+1 is relatively more productive instead.
There is, however, one important difference between a standard Ricardian model and our model with sequential production. In a standard Ricardian model, the pattern of comparative advantage only depends on exogenous productivity differences. In our model, the same pattern depends on endogenous differences in labor cost shares across stages. According to Equation (8) in Lemma 2, we have
Hence the labor cost share of country c's exports depends on: (i) the price of country c's imports, p c−1 ; (ii) the volume of imports necessary to produce one unit of export, e λ c N c ; and (iii) the associated amount of labor necessary to transform imports into exports, e λ c N c −1 /λ c . Having characterized how an increase in complexity affects the pattern of vertical specialization, it is COSTINOT ET AL.
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fairly easy to evaluate how it affects each of these three components. From the first part of Proposition 3, we know that countries are both moving up into higher stages and performing more stages. Moving up into higher stages tends to increase import prices and hence, p c−1 /w c . Performing more stages also increases the amount of labor necessary to transform imports into exports, e λ c N c −1 /λ c . In addition, it raises the volume of imports necessary to produce one unit of export, e λ c N c . In this situation, all three effects tend to lower the labor cost share of intermediate goods that are being traded, which explains why inequality between nations increases.
Standardization
In most industries, production processes become more standardized as goods mature over time.
To study the potential implications of this particular type of technological change within our theoretical framework, we now consider a uniform decrease in failure rates from λ c to λ c ≡ βλ c for all c ∈ C, with β <1, which we simply refer to as "standardization". The consequences of standardization on the pattern of vertical specialization and the world income distribution can be described as follows.
Proposition 4. Standardization leads all countries to move up the supply chain and decreases inequality between countries around the world.
The consequences of standardization are illustrated in Figure 2 . For a given pattern of vertical specialization, standardization tends to raise total output-and, therefore, the demand for laborat all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this increase in output levels must be partially offset by a reduction of output at earlier stages of production. Hence, poor countries must increase the measure of stages that they perform, pushing all countries up the supply chain.
Like in our first comparative static exercise, the logic behind the changes in the world income distribution is more subtle. The direct effect of standardization on relative wages is to decrease inequality. By construction, for any pair countries c 2 and c 1 such that c 2 > c 1 , we have λ c 1 −λ c 2 = β λ c 1 −λ c 2 > 0. Thus the productivity gap between poor and rich countries is lower for any β ∈ (0,1). In the extreme case in which β = 0, having a lower rate of mistakes λ c does not provide any benefit. There is, however, an indirect, general equilibrium effect associated with changes in the pattern of vertical specialization. To establish that the direct effect necessarily dominates the indirect one, the basic idea behind our proof is to normalize the measures of stages performed and export prices by β. Under this normalization, standardization is equivalent to a reduction in complexity: because both tend to reduce output lost to mistakes, they both require countries to move down the (normalized) supply chain, which leads to a fall in inequality between countries.
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It is interesting to note that while standardization and an increase in complexity both cause all countries to move up the supply chain, they have opposite effects on inequality between nations.
The previous comparative static results are reminiscent of Vernon's (1966) "product cycle hypothesis"; see also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Antràs (2005) . In our model, as a particular production process becomes more standardized, less productive countries start performing a broader set of stages. As this happens, our analysis demonstrates that inequality 120 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES between nations decreases around the world. Figure 2 also illustrates that although the direct effect of standardization is to increase output in all countries, welfare may fall in the most technologically advanced countries through a terms-of-trade deterioration. This is reminiscent of Bhagwati's (1958) "immiserizing growth". Two key differences, however, need to be highlighted. First, standardization increases productivity in all countries in the global supply chain, whereas Bhagwati's (1958) immiserizing growth occurs in response to an outward shift in the production possibility frontier in a single country. Second, and more importantly, standardization proportionately increases productivity at all stages of production, whereas Bhagwati's (1958) immiserizing growth occurs in response to an outward shift in the export sector. In our model, it is the sequential nature of production that makes uniform productivity growth endogenously act as export-biased technological change in the more technologically advanced countries. 
LOCAL TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Two of the major changes in today's world economy are: (i) the increased fragmentation of the production process, which Baldwin (2006) refers to as the "Great Unbundling"; and (ii) the rise of China and other developing countries, such as India and Brazil. Although both phenomena have been studied separately, we know very little about their interaction, either theoretically or empirically. The goal of this section is to use our elementary theory of global supply chains to 11. Like in Bhagwati's original article, however, it should be clear that immiserizing growth arises in this environment because of strong complementarities between goods. In our model, producing one unit of intermediate good always requires one unit of the intermediate good produced in the previous stage and one unit of labor. This explains why technological changes may have large (and adverse) terms-of-trade effects. take a first stab at this issue. To do so, our second series of comparative static exercises focuses on the impact of labor-augmenting technical progress and routinization in one country and describes how they spill over to other countries in the same supply chain through terms-of-trade effects.
Labor-augmenting technical progress
We first study the impact of labor-augmenting technical progress, which increases the total efficiency units of labor in a given country c 0 from L c 0 to L c 0 > L c 0 . Following the same two-step logic as in Section 4, the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress can be described as follows. The spillover effects associated with labor-augmenting technical progress are illustrated in Figure 3 . The broad intuition behind the changing patterns of specialization is simple. An increase in the supply of labor (in efficiency units) in one country tends to raise total output at all stages of production. Since labor supply must remain equal to labor demand, this increase in output levels must be accompanied by a decrease in the measure of stages N c performed in each country c = c 0 . Proceeding by iteration from the bottom and the top of the supply chain, we can then show that this change in N c can only occur if all countries below c 0 move down and all countries above c 0 move up. Finally, since the total measure of stages remains constant, the measure of stages N c 0 performed in country c 0 must increase.
Changes in the pattern of vertical specialization naturally translate into changes in the world income distribution. Countries at the bottom of the chain are moving down into lower stages and performing fewer stages. Both changes tend to increase the labor cost share of intermediate goods that are being traded and decrease inequality between nations at the bottom of the chain. The non-monotonic effects on inequality at the top of the chain reflect two conflicting forces. On the one hand, countries at the top of the chain are moving up. This tends to increase their import prices, reduce the labor cost share of their exports, and in turn, increase inequality. On the other hand, countries at the top of the chain are performing fewer stages. This decreases both the volume of imports and amount of labor necessary to produce one unit of their exports, which tends to raise the labor cost share of their exports, and in turn, decrease inequality.
13
The previous non-monotonic effects stand in sharp contrast to the predictions of standard Ricardian models and illustrate nicely the importance of modeling the sequential nature of production for understanding the consequences of technological changes in developing and developed countries on their trading partners worldwide. To see this, consider a Ricardian model without sequential production in which there is a ladder of countries with poor countries at the bottom and rich countries at the top. Krugman (1986) is a well-known two-country example. In 12. In line with our previous comparative static exercises, when discussing changes in the world income distribution, we focus on changes in wages per efficiency units. For all countries c = c 0 , this is equivalent to changes in wages per worker. For country c 0 , however, one should keep in mind that the two types of changes are distinct. If M c 0 denotes population size in country c 0 , then the wage per worker is w c 0 L c 0 /M c 0 . Thus a decrease in w c 0 does not necessarily imply a decrease in wages per worker in that country.
13. Note that since c 1 ∈ {c 0 +1,...,C}, the third group of countries, {c 1 ,...,C −1}, is non-empty if c 1 < C, but empty if c 1 = C. We have encountered both cases in our simulations.
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Figure 3
Consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress in country 3 such an environment, if foreign labor-augmenting technical progress leads the richest countries to move up, inequality among these countries necessarily increases. The reason is simple. On the one hand, the relative wage of two adjacent countries is equal to their relative productivity in the "cutoff" sector. On the other hand, richer countries are relatively more productive in sectors higher up the ladder (otherwise they would not be specializing in these sectors in equilibrium). In contrast, Proposition 5 predicts that as the richest countries move up, inequality may decrease at the very top of the chain. This counterintuitive result derives from the fact that the pattern of comparative advantage in a model with sequential production is not exogenously given, but depends instead on endogenous labor cost shares along the supply chain. This subtle distinction breaks the monotonic relationship between the pattern of international specialization and inequality between nations. Although later stages necessarily have lower labor cost shares in a given equilibrium, the labor cost shares of later stages in the new equilibrium may be higher than the labor cost shares of earlier stages in the initial equilibrium. At the top of the chain, poorer countries may therefore benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production.
Routinization
We now turn our attention to the consequences of a decrease in the failure rate λ c 0 of a given country c 0 , which we refer to as "routinization". For simplicity we restrict ourselves to a small change in λ c 0 , in the sense that it does not affect the ranking of countries in terms of failure rates. The consequences of routinization can be described as follows. Consequences of routinization in country 3 c ∈ {c 0 ,c 0 +1}, increases inequality among countries c ∈ {c 0 +1,...,c 1 }, and decreases inequality among countries c ∈ {c 1 ,...,C}, with c 1 ∈ {c 0 +1,...,C}.
The spillover effects associated with routinization are illustrated in Figure 4 . According to Proposition 6, all countries move up the supply chain. In this respect, the consequences of routinization are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress at the top of the chain, but the exact opposite at the bottom.
To understand this result, consider first countries located at the top of the chain. Since total output of the final good must rise in response to a lower failure rate in country c 0 , countries at the top of the chain must perform fewer stages for labor markets to clear. By a simple iterative argument, these countries must therefore move further up the supply chain, just like in Proposition 5. At the top of the chain, the consequences of routinization for inequality are the same as the consequences of labor-augmenting technical progress. The nonmonotonicity-with inequality rising among countries c ∈ {c 0 +1,...,c 1 } and decreasing among countries c ∈ {c 1 ,...,C}-arises from the same conflicting forces: countries move up the chain but produce fewer stages.
At the bottom of the chain, the broad intuition behind the opposite effects of labor-augmenting technical progress and routinization for changes in the pattern of specialization can be understood as follows. Holding the pattern of vertical specialization fixed, labor-augmenting technical progress in country c 0 increases the total labor supply of countries c ≥ c 0 , but leaves their labor demand unchanged. Thus labor market clearing requires countries at the bottom of the chain to reduce the number of stages they perform, to move down the chain, and to increase their output, thereby offsetting the excess labor supply at the top. In contrast, routinization in country c 0 increases the total labor demand of countries c ≥ c 0 (since country c 0 now produces more output 124 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES at each stage), but leaves their labor supply unchanged. As a result, countries at the bottom of the chain now need to increase the number of stages they perform, to move up the chain, and to reduce their output to offset the excess labor demand at the top. The consequences for inequality follow from the same logic as in the previous section. 14 Our goal in this section was to take a first stab at exploring theoretically the relationship between vertical specialization and the recent emergence of developing countries like China. Much remains to be done to assess whether the effects identified in this article are empirically important. Nevertheless, we view our theoretical analysis as a useful first step toward understanding how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations.Akey insight that has emerged is that because of sequential production, local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological changes, countries may move up or down, but regardless of the nature of technological changes, movements along the chain fully determine changes in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of the chain, in contrast, local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within that region may fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top.
EXTENSIONS
Our elementary theory of global supply chains is special along several dimensions. First, all intermediate goods are freely traded. Second, production is purely sequential. Third, mistakes are perfectly observable. Fourth, labor and intermediate goods are assumed to be perfect complements and all stages of production are subject to the same failure rates. In this section we demonstrate how more realistic features of global supply chains may be incorporated into our theoretical framework. To save on space, we focus on sketching alternative environments and summarizing their main implications. A detailed analysis can be found in our online Addendum.
Coordination costs
An important insight of the recent trade literature is that changes in trade costs affect the pattern and consequences of international trade not only by affecting final goods trade, but also by affecting the extent of production fragmentation across borders; see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , Yi (2003) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) . We now discuss how the introduction of trading frictions in our simple environment would affect the geographic structure of global supply chains, and in turn, the interdependence of nations.
A natural way to introduce trading frictions in our model is to assume that the likelihood of a defect in the final good is increasing in the number of times the intermediate goods used in its production have crossed a border. We refer to such costs, which are distinct from standard iceberg trade costs, as "coordination costs". Formally, if the production of a given unit u of the final good involves n international transactions-i.e. export and import at stages 0 < S u 1 ≤ S u 2 ≤ ··· ≤ S u n < Sthen the final good is defect free with probability (1−τ ) n . The parameter τ ∈ (0,1) measures the extent of coordination costs. Section 2 corresponds to the limit case when coordination costs go to zero. Upon completion of each unit of the final good, we assume that consumers perfectly observe whether the unit is defect free or not. A unit with a defect has zero price. Like in Section 2, we assume that the (defect-free) final good is freely traded and we use it as our numeraire. Finally, we assume that all international transactions are perfectly observable by all firms so that two units of the same intermediate good s may, in principle, command two different prices if their production requires a different number of international transactions. Accordingly, competitive equilibria remain Pareto optimal in the presence of coordination costs.
The analysis of this generalized version of our model is considerably simplified by the fact that, in spite of coordination costs, a weaker version of vertical specialization must still hold in any competitive equilibrium. Let c u (s) denote the country in which stage s has been performed for the production of a given unit u. Using the previous notation, the pattern of international specialization can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 1 [Coordination costs]
In any competitive equilibrium, the allocation of stages to countries, c u : S → C, is increasing in s for all u ∈ 0, c∈C Q c (S) .
According to this variation of Proposition 1, for any unit of the final good, production must still involve vertical specialization, with less productive countries specializing in earlier stages of production. This result is weaker, however, than the one derived in Section 2 in that it does not require c u (·) to be the same for all units. This should be intuitive. Consider the extreme case in which τ is arbitrarily close to one. In this situation all countries will remain under autarky in a competitive equilibrium. Thus the same stages of production will be performed in different countries. In the presence of coordination costs, one can therefore only expect vertical specialization to hold within each supply chain, whether or not all chains are identical, which is what our new proposition establishes. Armed with this proposition, we can characterize competitive equilibria using the same approach as in Section 2. The only difference is that we now need to guess first the structure of the equilibrium (e.g. some units are produced entirely in country 1, whereas all other units are produced jointly in all countries) and then verify ex post that our guess is correct. Figure 5 illustrates how the structure of competitive equilibria varies with the magnitude of coordination costs in the two-country case.
15 There are three distinct regions. For sufficiently high-coordination costs, all stages are being performed in both countries and there is no trade. Conversely, for low enough coordination costs, the pattern of vertical specialization is the same as under free trade. In this region, reductions in coordination costs have no effect on the pattern of specialization, but raise wages in all countries. The most interesting case arises when coordination costs are in an intermediate range. In this region, the large country (country 2) is incompletely specialized, whereas the small country (country 1) is completely specialized in a subset of stages. As can easily be shown analytically, the set of stages that are being offshored to the small country is necessarily increasing in the level of coordination costs over that range. Hence starting from autarky and decreasing coordination costs, there will be "overshooting": a broader set of stages will be performed in the poor country at intermediate levels of coordination costs than under perfectly free trade. This pattern of overshooting does not arise from coordination failures, heterogeneity in trade costs or the imperfect tradability of the final good, as discussed in Baldwin and Venables (2010) . It simply reflects the fact that in a perfectly competitive model with sequential production and trading frictions, a sufficiently large set of stages must be performed in 126 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES Figure 5 Consequences of a change in coordination costs the small country for firms to find it profitable to fragment production across borders. Accordingly, the larger the coordination costs, the larger the set of stages being performed in the small country! Figure 5 also illustrates that sequential production does not hinder the ability of smaller countries to benefit from international trade. On the contrary, smaller countries tend to benefit more from freer trade. In the above example, a decrease in coordination costs either only benefits the small country (for intermediate levels of coordination costs) or affects real wages in both countries in the same proportional manner (for low enough coordination costs). Finally, Figure 5 highlights that how many stages of the production process are being offshored to a poor country may be a very poor indicator of the interdependence of nations. Here, when the measure of stages being offshored is the largest, the rich country is completely insulated from (small) technological shocks in the poor country.
Simultaneous versus sequential production
Most production processes are neither purely sequential, as assumed in Section 2, nor purely simultaneous, as assumed in most of the existing literature. Producing an aircraft, for example, requires multiple parts, e.g. fuselage, stabilizer, landing gears, entry doors, seats and windows. Many of these parts are produced simultaneously before being assembled, but each of these parts requires a large number of sequential stages. For instance, the construction of a mid-fuselage section for the Boeing 787 Dreamliner in the USA involves the fabrication of wing-to-body fairing in Canada using panels made in China; see Gates (2005) . More generally, extraction of raw materials comes before refining, which itself comes before manufacturing.
With this is mind, we turn to a generalization of our original model in which there are multiple supply chains, indexed by n ∈ N ≡ {1,...,N}, each associated with the production of a part. We allow supply chains to differ in terms of their complexity, S n , but for simplicity, we require failure rates to be constant across chains and given by λ c , as in Section 2. Hence countries do not have a comparative advantage in particular parts. Parts are ordered such that S n is weakly increasing in n, so that parts with a higher index n are more complex.
Parts are assembled into a unique final good using labor. Formally, the output Y c of the final good in country c is given by
where F(·) is a production function with constant returns to scale, X n c is the amount of part n used in the production of the final good in country c, and A c ≤ L c corresponds to the amount of labor used for assembly in country c. Note that the production function F(·) is assumed to be identical across countries, thereby capturing the idea that assembly is sufficiently standardized for mistakes in this activity to be equally unlikely in all countries. Note also that by relabelling each part n as a distinct final good and the production function F(·) as a utility function, with F(·) independent of A c , this section can also be interpreted as a multi-sector extension of our baseline framework.
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In this generalized version of our model, the pattern of international specialization still takes a very simple form, as the next proposition demonstrates.
Proposition 1 [Simultaneous production] In any free trade equilibrium, there exists a sequence of stages S
0 ≡ 0 ≤ S 1 ≤ .
.. ≤ S C = S N such that for all n ∈ N , s∈ (0,S n ], and c ∈ C, Q n c (s) > 0 if and only if s ∈ (S c−1 ,S c ]. Furthermore, if country c is engaged in parts production, A c < L c , then all countries c > c are only involved in parts production, A c = 0.
This strict generalization of Proposition 1 imposes three restrictions on the pattern of international specialization. First, the poorest countries tend to specialize in assembly, whereas the richest countries tend to specialize in parts production. This directly derives from the higher relative productivity of the poorest countries in assembly. Second, among the countries that produce parts, richer countries produce and export at later stages of production. This result also held in Section 3, and the intuition is unchanged. Third, whereas middle-income countries tend to produce all parts, the richest countries tend to specialize in only the most complex ones. Intuitively, even the final stage S n of a simple part has a sufficiently high labor cost share that high-wage, high-productivity countries are less competitive at that stage. Viewed through the lens of the hierarchy literature, the final output of a simple chain does not embody a large enough amount of inputs to merit, from an efficiency standpoint, leveraging the productivity of the most productive countries.
Compared with the simple model analyzed in Section 3, the present model suggests additional cross-sectional predictions. Here, trade is more likely to be concentrated among countries with similar levels of GDP per capita if exports and imports tend to occur along the supply chain associated with particular parts rather than at the top between "part producers" and "assemblers". Accordingly, one should expect trade to be more concentrated among countries with similar levels of GDP per capita in industries in which the production process consists of very complex parts.
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Imperfect observability of mistakes
In our benchmark model, all mistakes are perfectly observable so that each country's exports are equally and fully reliable. In practice, quality concerns are a major determinant of the organization of global supply chains; see e.g. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) . To capture such considerations within our framework, we now generalize our model to allow countries to differ not only in terms of the rate at which they make mistakes, but also the probability with which mistakes are observed, i.e. their "quality control".
As before, when a mistake occurs on a given unit u at stage s, any intermediate good produced after stage s using unit u is also defective and the associated final good is worthless. Our only point of departure from our benchmark model is that mistakes are imperfectly observed with a country-specific probability β c ∈ [0,1]. The location in which different stages associated with a given unit have been performed is public information. All markets are perfectly competitive and all goods are freely traded. Thus different units of a given intermediate good s produced at different locations may command different prices depending on their "qualities", i.e. the commonly known probabilities that they are defect free.
In this environment, if a firm from country c combines q[s,θ (s)] units of intermediate good s with quality θ (s) with q[s,θ (s)]ds units of labor, its output at stage s+ds is given by q[s+ds,θ (s+ds)] = (1−β c λ c ds)q[s,θ (s)].
( 1 1 ) Using Bayes'rule and a first-order Taylor expansion, the quality at stage s+ds can be computed as
For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to "symmetric" free trade equilibria in which all units of the final good are produced in the same manner. The next proposition demonstrates how both β c and λ c shape the pattern of international specialization in this situation. This strict generalization of Proposition 1 states that countries with higher failures rates and better quality controls tend to specialize in the earlier stages of global supply chains. The tendency for less productive countries to produce and export at earlier stages of production is driven by the same forces as in our benchmark model. But there is now also a tendency for countries with better quality controls to specialize in the same stages. Intuitively, if a country makes an unobserved mistake in producing a unit of output u in stage s, which occurs at rate λ c (1−β c ), then firms will continue to add labor to this defective unit as it moves up the chain. If this unobserved mistake occurs lower down the chain, then more labor gets wasted. Hence, it is efficient to have countries with better quality control, all else equal, at the bottom of the chain. This again leads to more nuanced cross-sectional predictions than our benchmark model. Since richer countries are likely to have both lower failure rates and better quality control, the relative importance of these two considerations in different industries may determine whether or not they tend to operate at the top of global supply chains in practice.
General production functions
To focus attention in the simplest possible way on the novel aspects of an environment with sequential production, we have focused on a very stylized production process. Stages only differ in the order in which they are performed, and countries only differ in the rates at which mistakes occur along the supply chain. Formally, the production process underlying Equation (1) corresponds to the limit, when δs goes to zero, of the following Leontief production function:
In this final subsection, we relax the three main features of the above production function: perfect complementarity between labor and intermediate goods at all stages of production, symmetry between all stages of production, and production that is subject to mistakes (λ c > 0). Instead we assume the following CES production function:
where σ ≥ 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution at all stages of production and λ c (s) ∈ R is a measure of country c's total factor productivity at stage s. As demonstrated in our online Addendum, starting from the previous production function and substituting in the optimal labor demand, we obtain the following generalization of Equation (1):
Equation ( According to this strict generalization of Proposition 1, our cross-sectional predictions are unchanged if: (i) the elasticity of substitution between labor and intermediate goods is not too high, σ <1; (ii) later stages of production tend to be more costly to produce, λ c (s) > 0 or = 0; and (iii) more productive countries (at all stages) are relatively more productive in later stages of production, λ c (s) is weakly submodular. To understand this result, it is useful to go back to the intuition behind Proposition 1. In Section 3 prices were increasing along the supply chain. Thus the cost share of labor was relatively lower in the production of intermediate goods produced at later stages, which made them relatively cheaper to produce in countries with higher wages. Conditions (i)-(iii) guarantee that the same logic applies. By Condition (ii), prices are still increasing along the supply chain. By Condition (i), this implies that the cost share of labor remains relatively lower in the production of intermediate goods produced at later stages. Thus absent any comparative advantage across stages, more productive countries should tend to specialize in later stages of production. By Condition (iii), the previous pattern of international specialization is reinforced by the comparative advantage of more productive countries in later stages.
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Although the basic forces emphasized in Sections 4 and 5 still shape the interdependence of nations, deriving comparative static predictions in this more general environment is more involved. Consider the smallest departure from our baseline model: assuming that production is no longer subject to mistakes, λ c < 0 for all c. In this situation, all of the comparative static results on vertical specialization derived in Sections 4 and 5 continue to hold. Nevertheless, the implications for the world income distribution are more subtle as changes in the measures of stages performed in each country are no longer sufficient to predict how changes in the pattern of vertical specialization affect inequality between nations.
18 A similar issue arises in environments in which failure rates are no longer constant across stages of production. Finally, without perfect complementarity between labor and intermediate goods, our model is no longer block-recursive: prices affect labor demand, and thus, the assignment of countries to stages of production.
These issues notwithstanding, the pattern of international specialization in this extension, as well as the extensions presented in Sections 6.1-6.3, always exhibits vertical specialization. This implies that the free trade equilibrium remains characterized by a simple system of non-linear difference equations, akin to the ones presented in Lemmas 1 and 2. Accordingly, it is still easy to use simulations to investigate how global supply chains shape the interdependence of nations. We hope that this appealing feature of our theoretical framework will make it a useful guide for future work on global supply chains in richer, more realistic environments.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this article, we have developed an elementary theory of global supply chains. The key feature of our theory is that production is sequential and subject to mistakes. In the unique free trade equilibrium, countries with lower probabilities of making mistakes at all stages specialize in later stages of production. Because of the sequential nature of production, absolute productivity differences are a source of comparative advantage among nations.
Using this simple theoretical framework, we have taken a first step toward analyzing how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence of nations. Among other things, we have shown that local technological changes tend to spillover very differently at the bottom and the top of the chain. At the bottom of the chain, depending on the nature of technological changes, countries may move up or down, but whatever they do, movements along the chain fully determine changes in the world income distribution within that region. At the top of the chain, in contrast, local technological progress always leads countries to move up, but even conditioning on the nature of technological change, inequality between nations within that region may fall or rise. Perhaps surprisingly, while richer countries at the bottom of the chain benefit disproportionately more from being pushed into later stages of production, this is not always true at the top.
Our model is admittedly stylized, but we believe that its tractability lends itself to a variety of extensions and applications. The previous section has explored some of them. There are many others. For instance, we have focused on a perfectly competitive environment. It would be interesting to extend our framework to allow for monopolistic competition and endogenous innovation. We have also ignored any policy-related issues. It would be interesting to investigate how global supply chains may affect countries' commercial policies, and in turn, the optimal design of international trade agreements. One could also analyze competition between countriesperhaps through infrastructure spending or education policies-to capture higher positions in 18. Specifically, if λ c < 0, then while increasing the measure of stages performed in a country c still increases the amount of labor necessary to transform imports into one unit of export, e λcNc −1 /λ c , it now decreases the volume of imports necessary to produce one unit of export, e λcNc , thereby pushing labor cost shares, and in turn, relative wages in the opposite direction. 
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supply chains. Last but not least, it would be interesting to incorporate our simple model with sequential production into a standard quantitative trade model, such as Eaton and Kortum (2002) , to explore the quantitative implications of global supply chains for the interdependence of nations. Such a model would be ideally suited to organize recent empirical evidence on trade in value added (e.g. Johnson and Noguera, 2011 ). Although we have emphasized the consequences of vertical specialization for the interdependence of nations, we believe that our general results also have useful applications outside of international trade. Sequential production processes are pervasive in practice. They may involve workers of different skills, as emphasized in the labor and organizations literature. They may also involve firms of different productivities, as in the industrial organization literature. Whatever the particular context may be, our theoretical analysis may help shed a new light on how vertical specialization shapes the interdependence between different actors of a given supply chain. . Throughout this proof we define (s) ≡ (s ,s + ), for some s satisfying the previous conditions. The local properties that follow do not depend on which exact s we choose. We proceed in four steps.
Step 1: p(·) is continuous. Step 2: If s 2 > s 1 , then p(s 2 ) > p(s 1 ).
By
Step 1 we know that p(·) is continuous. By Step 1 we also know that for any stage s ∈ (0,S], there is a small neighborhood (s) of s such that p(·) is a solution of Equation (13). Thus p (s) > 0 for almost all s ∈ (0,S]. The fact that p(·) is strictly increasing directly derives from these two observations.
Step 3 
Since λ c 2 <λ c 1 , Equation (14) and Inequality (15) imply w c 2 > w c 1 .
Step 4: If c 2 > c 1 and
We proceed by contradiction. 
By
Step 2, we know that p(s 1 −ds)−p(s 2 −ds) > 0. Thus the previous inequality implies 1+λ c 2 ds w c 1 ≥ 1+λ c 1 ds w c 2 .
Since λ c 2 <λ c 1 , Inequality (16) implies w c 1 > w c 2 , which contradicts Step 3.
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, let us define S c ≡ sup{s ∈ S|Q c (s) > 0} for all c ∈ C. By Step 4, we must have 
Proof of Lemma 1. We first consider Equation (6). Proposition 1 and Equation (3) imply
Taking the derivative of the previous expression with respect to s 2 , we get
The solution of the previous differential equation must satisfy
Proposition 1 and Equation (3) also imply
Since ds is infinitesimal, this further implies
Equation ( Let us now turn to Equation (5). By Proposition 1 and Equation (4), we know that
By Equations (17) and (19), we also know that
Equations (20) and (21) imply
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Equation ( for any c < C. After simplifications, the two previous inequalities can be rearranged as
Since p is continuous and ds is infinitesimal, we get
which is equivalent to Equation (7) by the definition of p c ≡ p(S c ).
Let us now turn to Equation (8). Proposition 1 and Condition (2) imply
which further implies dp(s) ds
The solution of the previous differential Equation must satisfy
which is equivalent to Equation ( 
Proof of Proposition 2.
We proceed in four steps.
Step 1: (S 0 ,...,S C ) and (Q 0 ,...,Q C ) satisfy Equations (5) and (6) if and only if
Let us first show that if (S 0 ,...,S C ) and (Q 0 ,...,Q C ) satisfy Equations (5) and (6), then they satisfy Equations (23) and (24) . Consider Equation (24). Equations (5) and (6) imply
By iteration we therefore have
Now consider Equation (23). Starting from Equation (5) and iterating we get
Equation (23) directly derives from the previous expression and Equation (24) . It is a matter of simple algebra to check that if (S 0 ,...,S C ) and (Q 0 ,...,Q C ) satisfy Equations (23) and (24), then they satisfy Equations (5) and (6).
Step 2: There exists a unique pair of vectors (S 0 ,...,S C ) and (Q 0 ,...,Q C ) satisfying Equations (5) and (6) and the boundary conditions: S 0 = 0 and S C = S. Step 2 derives from Step 1 and the previous observation.
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Step 3: For any (N 1 ,. Thus taking (N 1 ,. ..,N C ) as given and having set p 0 = 0, we only need to check that there exists a unique w 1 such that p C = 1. To do so, we first establish that p C is strictly increasing in w 1 . We proceed by iteration. By Equation (8), we know that p 1 is strictly increasing in w 1 . Thus by Equation (7), w 2 must be strictly increasing in w 1 as well. Now suppose that p c−1 and w c are strictly increasing in w 1 for c < C. Then p c must be strictly increasing in w 1 , by Equation (8), and w c+1 must be strictly increasing in w 1 , by Equation (7). At this point we have established, by iteration, that p C−1 and w C are strictly increasing in w 1 . Combining this observation with Equation (8), we obtain that p C is strictly increasing in w 1 . To conclude, let us note that, by Equations (7) and (8), we also have lim w 1 →0 p C = 0 and lim w 1 →+∞ p C =+∞. Since p C is strictly increasing in w 1 , there therefore exists a unique w 1 such that p C = 1.
Steps 1-3 imply the existence and uniqueness of (S 0 ,...,S C ), (Q 0 ,...,Q C ), (w 1 ,...,w C ) and (p 0 ,...,p C ) that satisfy Equations (5)- (8) with boundary conditions S 0 = 0, S C = S, p 0 = 0 and p C = 1. Now consider the following output levels and intermediate good prices
. 
B. Proofs (II): global technological change
Proof of Proposition 3. We decompose the proof of Proposition 3 into three parts. First, we show that an increase in S increases the measure of stages N c performed in all countries. Second, we show that an increase in S leads all countries to move up the supply chain. Third, we show that an increase in S increases inequality between countries around the world.
We first show that N 1 > N 1 by contradiction. Suppose that N 1 ≤ N 1 . By Equation (5), Equation (6) and the definition of N c ≡ S c −S c−1 , we know that
According to Equation ( We proceed by iteration. By Lemma 1 and Part I, we know that S 1 = N 1 > S 1 = N 1 . Thus S c > S c is satisfied for c = 1. Let us now show that if S c > S c for 1 ≤ c < C, then S c+1 > S c+1 . By definition, we know that S c+1 = S c +N c+1 and S c+1 = S c +N c+1 . By Part I, we also know that
The proof of Part III proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If N 1 > N 1 , then (w 2 /w 1 ) > (w 2 /w 1 ).
Since p 0 = 0, we know from Equations (7) and (8) that
Proof of Proposition 4. We decompose the proof of Proposition 4 into three parts. First, we show that a decrease in β increases the measure of stages N c performed by all countries c < c 1 and decreases the measure of stages N c performed by all countries c ≥ c 1 , with 1 < c 1 ≤ C. Second, we show that a decrease in β leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in β decreases inequality between countries around the world. Step 1: If β <β, then N c < N c for all countries c ∈ C.
The proof is similar to Part I of the proof of Proposition 3. We first show that N 1 < N 1 by contradiction. Suppose that N 1 ≥ N 1 . By Equation (5), Equation (6) and the definition of N c , we know that Step 2: If N c < N c for all countries c ∈ C, then (w c+1 /w c ) < (w c+1 /w c ) for all c < C.
Equations (7) and (8) can be rearranged as Like in our previous proofs, we will repeatedly use the following relationship
where ∂N c /∂N c−1 > 0 and ∂N c /∂L c > 0. The proof of Part I proceeds in two steps.
Step
Let us first establish that Q C > Q C . By Proposition 1, we know that
. By the First Welfare Theorem, we also know that the allocation in a free trade equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Thus Q C must be the maximum output level of the final good attainable given the new resource and technological constraints, i.e.,
where
and Q c (s) ≡ Q c (s), for all s ∈ S and c = c 0 .
Since Q 1 (·),...,Q C (·) satisfies the initial resource and technological constraints, as described by Conditions (3) and (4), Q 1 (·),..., Q C (·) must satisfy, by construction, the new resource and technological constraints, as described by Conditions (35) and (36) . Since L c 0 > L c 0 , we must also have
Since Q C ≥ Q c 0 (S)+ Q C (S), the previous inequality implies Q C > Q C . By Equation (5), Equation (6) and the definition of N c , we also know that 
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Step 2 
Q c = λ c L c e −λcNc 1−e −λcNc , for all c ∈ C.
Equation ( The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.
Step 1 Proof of Proposition 6. We decompose the proof of Proposition 6 into three parts. First, we show that a decrease in λ c 0 increases the measure of stages N c performed in all countries c < c 0 and decreases the measure of stages N c performed in all countries c > c 0 . Second, we show that a decrease in λ c 0 leads all countries to move up. Third, we show that a decrease in λ c 0 increases inequality among countries c ∈ {1,...,c 0 }, decreases inequality among countries c ∈ {c 0 ,c 0 +1}, increases inequality among countries c ∈ {c 0 +1,...,c 1 }, and decreases inequality among countries c ∈ {c 1 ,...,C}, with c 1 ∈ {c 0 +1,...,C}. 
where ∂N c /∂N c−1 > 0. The proof of Part I proceeds in two steps.
Step 1 Step 2 The proof of Part II proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If λ c 0 <λ c 0 , then S c > S c for all c ∈ {c 0 ,...,C −1}.
The proof is identical to the proof of Step 1 Part II of Proposition 5 and omitted.
